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The Social Security Administration's Policy of
Nonacquiescence
INTRODUCTION
In a recent speech at Tulane University, Attorney General Edwin Meese III
stated his position on the precedential effect of United States Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution. According to Meese, a Supreme Court
decision binds "the parties and also the executive branch for whatever
enforcement is necessary. But such a decision ... is [not] binding on all
persons and parts of government, henceforth and forever more." 1 The ex-
ecutive and legislative branches, no less than the judicial branch, have the
duty to interpret the Constitution and are therefore justified in challenging
Supreme Court precedent with which they disagree. 2 Though the reactions
to the Tulane speech varied, many viewed Meese's comments as a public
endorsement of lawlessness. 3 The Attorney General's statements on the pre-
cedential effect of Supreme Court caselaw merely reflect the current admin-
istration's views on the validity of judicial review. A case in point is the
Social Security Administration's ("SSA") policy of intra-circuit nonac-
quiescence.
In the early 1980's, amidst the universal call for fiscal austerity, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services began accelerating review of the
eligibility of recipients of disability benefits4 under the Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance ("SSDI") program5 and the Supplemental Security Income
("SSI") program.6 In addition, the SSA tightened eligibility requirements
1. Press & McDaniel, The Crusades of Ed Meese: Taking on the Supreme Court and the
Liberal Past, NEws EEK, Nov. 3, 1986, at 24.
2. Id.
3. See Lacayo, Supreme or Not Supreme: That is the Question, Says the Attorney General,
Tiar, Nov. 3, 1986, at 46; Press & McDaniel, supra note 1, at 24; N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1986,
at A17, col. 1.
4. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 mandated that the SSA implement
a program effective January 1, 1982 to review periodically the continuing eligibility of disability
benefit recipients. In March 1981, the Secretary accelerated review pursuant to the Reagan
administration budget initiatives of fiscal year 1982. See Social Security Disability Reviews;
The Human Costs: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
74-75 (1984) [hereinafter Special Committee Hearing].
5. Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") comes under Title II of the Social Security
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982 & Supp. III 1986); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1-404.2127
(1985).
6. Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") comes under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act. The SSI program is thought of as a federal welfare program because it provides benefits
to individuals who have not paid money into social security. Eligibility is based on need and
age, blindness or disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83c (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.101-416.2227 (1985).
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and placed the burden of proving continuing eligibility upon the beneficiary,
often resulting in the termination of benefits in cases where the beneficiary
had not improved mentally or physically.7 Many of the terminations were
appealed and thus found their way into the federal courts.
The federal judiciary responded to the Secretary's actions by finding them
inconsistent with the Social Security Act.' Faced with adverse circuit court
decisions undermining what it had perceived as proper implementation of
the Social Security Act, the agency ignored those decisions with which it
disagreed through its policy of intra-circuit nonacquiescence. 9
Under a policy of intra-circuit nonacquiescence, 0 administrative agencies
refuse to recognize the validity of "the law of the circuit."" The SSA abided
by adverse circuit court decisions in the cases in which they were rendered
but refused to recognize the decisions as binding precedents in similar future
claims brought within the same circuit. 2 The SSA practiced nonacquiescence
even though it never appealed the adverse interpretations at issue.'3
7. See Special Committee Hearing, supra note 4, at 75; H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADn~m. NEws 3038, 3047-48.
8. In Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641
F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the SSA could not terminate benefits for a lack of disability unless the Secretary had first
established medical improvement.
9. The Secretary issued Social Security Rulings ("SSR") directing all agency personnel to
disregard the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Patti, 669 F.2d 582 (SSR 82-49c) and Finnegan, 641
F.2d 1340 (SSR 82-10c).
10. Commentators distinguish between intra-circuit nonacquiescence and inter-circuit non-
acquiescence. In the latter, an administrative agency will abide by "the law of the circuit"
with which it disagrees but seek to apply its own interpretation in another circuit. Through
inter-circuit nonacquiescence, agencies attempt to establish a split in the circuits-creating a
situation in which Supreme Court review is more likely. See Note, "Respectful Disagreement".
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Court of Appeals Prec-
edents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463 (1985).
11. Many different administrative agencies practice nonacquiescence. The National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") have done so on a
consistent basis. Commentators have criticized these agencies for the same reasons they criticize
the SSA. The NLRB, in particular, has been chastised by members of the judiciary. See Ithaca
College v. NLRB, 623 .F.2d 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Allegheny Gen.
Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
Most commentators, however, treat the brand of nonacquiescence practiced by the SSA as
less justifiable. Both the IRS and the NLRB are subject to liberal venue provisions which make
it difficult for these agencies to predict which forum will be chosen for litigation. Thus, they
do not always know which circuit caselaw to apply. Further, nonacquiescence by either the
IRS or the NLRB is more likely to affect individuals who can afford to wait for the vindication
of their rights in federal court. For a more thorough discussion, see Note, supra note 10. See
also Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 582 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d
428 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The Secretary acknowledges that he was bound on remand to follow the
law of the case doctrine. The Secretary, however, makes clear his belief that the Social Security
Administration is not bound by stare decisis to follow lower court precedent.").
13. The Secretary's failure to appeal adverse circuit court decisions will be discussed in




The judicial and legislative branches of government soon took notice of
the Secretary's use of nonacquiescence. The SSA's calculated disregard for
"the law of the circuit" precipitated criticism from federal district and circuit
court judges who constantly reminded the Secretary of the well-settled rules
of law they enforced in their courtrooms. 4 Congress, also alarmed by the
constitutional ramifications and practical consequences of a policy of non-
acquiescence, 15 urged the abandonment of such a policy.
6
In response to the growing criticism, the Secretary modified her policy of
nonacquiescence; if a claim was appealed to an Administrative Law Judge,
"the law of the circuit" was available. 7 Soon thereafter, however, a federal
district court, in Stieberger v. Heckler,8 granted a preliminary injunction
ordering the SSA to follow circuit court precedent. The court held that the
plaintiffs would likely be able to show at trial that the agency's new pro-
cedures violated the separation of powers doctrine as well as fifth amendment
due process. 19 Members of Congress also voiced their disappointment in the
SSA's modified policy.20
Part I of this Note traces the development and modification of nonac-
quiescence. Part II examines the SSA's defense of nonacquiescence-that
the SSA is part of a co-equal branch of government and thus not bound
by federal circuit court precedent. Part III argues that intra-circuit nonac-
quiescence violates the separation of powers doctrine, stare decisis, and due
process. Nonacquiescence also undermines the legitimacy of administrative
agencies in our constitutional system and calls into question the validity of
traditional principles of administrative law. Finally, part IV recommends
that Congress assume primary responsibility for controlling agency action
by providing specific legislative directives.
14. See, e.g., Capitano v. Secretary of H.H.S., 732 F.2d 1066, 1070 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984);
Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 n.14 (D.D.C.
1984); Buckner v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Polaski v. Heckler,
585 F. Supp. 997, 1001-02 (D. Minn. 1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 29-30 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), stay denied, 463 U.S. 1326 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacation of stay denied,
464 U.S. 880 (1983); Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1204-06 (D. Colo. 1983); Hillhouse,
547 F. Supp. at 91-93.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 24-26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEws 3038, 3061-63.
16. See H.R. CoN. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 37-38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AnmN. NEws 3080, 3095.
17. The modification, which was announced on June 3, 1985, is found in Interim Circular
No. 185 of the OHA Handbook, reprinted in Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, app.
C (S.D.N.Y. 1985), injunction vacated sub. nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986) [hereinafter Interim Circular].
18. Id. at app. A.
19. Id. at 1374.
20. See Implementation of the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1984: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th




I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODIFICATION OF NONACQUIESCENCE
A. The Original Policy
Although conceding that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Social
Security Act are definitive and bind the agency, the SSA's original policy
of nonacquiescence provided that the agency was not similarly bound by
interpretations of the law found in the unappealed decisions of a district or
circuit court. 2' Occasionally, the SSA formally implemented this policy by
issuing a Social Security Ruling ("SSR") that instructed agency employees
to disregard a specific circuit court decision. More frequently, the agency
simply continued to use its own interpretation and neglected to appeal or
follow an adverse circuit court decision. n In this way, the Secretary argued,
the agency could maintain nationally uniform standards.
23
Agency nonacquiescence meant that a claimant could take advantage of
"the law of the circuit" only after first exhausting all administrative rem-
edies. 24 To illustrate the impact this policy had on claimants seeking SSDI
21. The original policy of nonacquiescence was contained in the OHA Handbook. The
OHA Handbook is compiled by the Office of Hearings and Appeals. It contains instructions
for ALJ's to follow in deciding Social Security cases. See § 1.161 of the OHA Handbook,
reprinted in Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), injunction vacated
sub. nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
22. See SuBcomm. ON OvERSIGrr OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., THE RoLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
IN THE TITLE II SOCIAL SEcurrY DISABITY INSURANcE PROGRAM 25 (Comm. Print 1983),
reprinted in Social Security Disability Review: The Human Costs: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess 246 (1984) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
23. See Social Security Disability Reviews: A Costly Constitutional Crisis: Hearing Before
the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1984).
[O]ur policy of nonacquiescence is essential to ensure that the agency follows it[s]
statutory mandate to administer the Social Security program nationwide in a
uniform and consistent manner. In a program of national scope, it would not be
equitable to people to subject their claims to differing standards depending on
where they reside.
Id.
24. Exhaustion of remedies is a judicially created doctrine which requires that an individual
pursue all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. 5 MEzINEs, STENm
& GRun', ADmsSTRATIVE LAW § 49.01 (rev. ed. 1985). The Supreme Court in FTC v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (citations omitted) made a clear statement
regarding judicial review before administrative remedies are exhausted:
[It] is likely to be interference with the proper functioning of the agency and a
burden for the courts. Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the
agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise....
Intervention also leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and
upon the completion of the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is codified in § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. This
provision permits judicial review of a "final decision" of the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)




or SSI benefits,2 consider the following example: Grace is a forty year old
woman whose physician has diagnosed her as disabled. Grace lives within
the Second Circuit where the Court of Appeals has held that the diagnosis
of the treating physician is binding on the fact-finder unless contradicted by
substantial evidence. The SSA, however, accords less weight to the opinion
of the claimant's doctor. 26 Grace's application for disability benefits is first
reviewed by a state agency.27 The state agency is charged with determining
whether the claimant is disabled, the date the disability began, and the date
the disability ended.? This initial determination, however, is subject to
potential "own motion" review by the Secretary. 9 Assume the state agency
denies Grace benefits in accordance with SSA policy; although contradicting
evidence exists showing a lack of disability, it is not substantial. Next, Grace
asks the state agency to reconsider her claim de novo 30 The result of this
reconsideration is also reviewable by the SSA, 31 Upon receiving an unfa-
vorable decision based on the existence of contradicting evidence, Grace
leaves the state agency level.
Grace next requests a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ").32 At this hearing the ALI questions the claimant in order
to fully develop the record. 33 The ALU's decision is also subject to "own
motion" review by the SSA's Appeals Council.54 Grace receives another
unfavorable decision. She then asks the Appeals Council to review her
claim.3- The Appeals Council will either deny Grace's request for review or
it will affirm the ALJ's holding. In either case, Grace will have exhausted
her administrative remedies 6 After this, she can file suit in a federal district
court, which will apply the Second Circuit's "treating physician rule. ' 37 In
contrast, absent the policy of nonacquiescence, the state agency would have
applied the Second Circuit's "treating physician rule" in its initial deter-
25. Structurally, the administrative review process is the same whether SSDI or SSI disability
benefits are sought. In the example that will be given, the claimant is seeking benefits for the
first time. However, the same process must be followed by an individual who wants to appeal
the termination of his benefits. See Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1324.
26. This hypothetical is fashioned after the facts in Stielierger where a class action was
brought to make the SSA apply the Second Circuit treating physician rule to claimants residing
in the Second Circuit. Id. at 1321.
27. See 42 US.C. § 421(a) (Supp. III 1985).
28, See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(c) (1986) (SSD); 20 C.F.R, § 416,903(c) (1986) (SSI),
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(d) (1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. §
416.903(d) (1986) (SSI).
30. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1407 (1986) (SSf).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982).
32. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416,1429 (1986) (SS).,
33. See 20 C.F.R . § 404.944 (1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416,1444 (1986) (SSI).
34. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1986) (SSDt); 20 C.F.R. § 4041469 (1986) (SSI),
35. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1467 (1986) (SSI).
36. The Appeal Council can also remand the case to an ALI. See 20 C.F.R. § 404,977
(1986) (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. 9 416.A477 (1986) (SSI.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
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mination of eligibility, and Grace would have received the benefits to which
she was entitled.
B. Criticism of the Original Policy
Though practiced since 1976, it was not until the 1980's that the SSA's
use of nonacquiescence caused a great deal of friction between the federal
judiciary and the agency. Because of the SSA's voluntary acceleration of
reviews under its program of continuing disability investigations ("CDI") 38
and its tightened eligibility rules,3 9 a burgeoning number of individuals,
finding their disability benefits terminated, began making their way through
the administrative review process.40 Not surprisingly, this resulted in a large
increase in the number of cases reaching the federal courts.
41
As the amount of federal court litigation increased, several SSA review
policies and procedures came under judicial scrutiny.42 Frequently, courts
found that the Secretary was not acting in accordance with the Social Security
Act in conducting CDIs. 43 The Secretary did not appeal these decisions.
Instead, the Secretary ignored the decisions and continued to conduct CDIs
in the same manner.-
As federal judges began to see that the SSA was not implementing judicial
interpretations of the Social Security Act, many opinions began to attack
the policy of nonacquiescence itself. These opinions stated that the policy
violated the separation of powers doctrine, the principle of stare decisis, and
the due process clause. 4 Despite the ever-increasing tension between the
federal courts and the SSA, the Secretary continued to practice non-
acquiescence.
Congress, however, was disturbed by the escalating hostility between the
executive and judicial branches. 46 In its report on the Social Security Dis-
38. See supra note 4.
39. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
40. Between March 1981 and November 1983, the SSA terminated the disability benefits
of 470,000 beneficiaries. Special Committee Hearing, supra note 4, at 73.
41. In the years between 1955 and 1970, there were a total of 10,000 disability claims
appealed to federal district court. In the year 1982 alone, there were 13,000 appeals filed in
federal district courts. H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 23 reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADnua. NEWS 3038, 3060.
42. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
45. See Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 463 U.S. 1326
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacation of stay denied, 464 U.S. 880 (1983) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring) ("The Secretary's nonacquiescence ... flouts ... the doctrine of separation of
powers embedded in the constitution."); Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark.
1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983) (court asserts that SSA is bound by stare decisis);
Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Minn. 1984) ("the Secretary is not adhering
to its constitutional duty to provide due process to individual claimants.").
46. See H.R. RaP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 25, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADNN. NEws 3038, 3062.
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ability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, the Committee on Ways and Means
criticized nonacquiescence for creating two separate classes of claimants:
those who were able to persevere through the administrative review process
and those who were not.47 In addition, the Committee expressed the concern
that "[t]he increasingly adversarial character of the process for becoming
eligible for disability benefits, and especially for retaining eligibility, does
immeasurable harm to the public's trust in the Social Security program and
in government as a whole. ' 48 Despite its concern, Congress did not pass
legislation in its 1984 amendments prohibiting the agency from practicing
nonacquiescence. A House bill would have required the agency to abide by
circuit court interpretations unless the adverse decisions were under appeal
to the Supreme Court.4 9 The Senate's proposed amendment would have
required only that the agency notify Congress and report in the Federal
Register its intention to acquiesce or not acquiesce in a circuit court's inter-
pretation of the Social Security Act.50 Ultimately, the Conference Agreement
dropped both proposals. Instead, the conferees urged the SSA to restrict
nonacquiescence to those cases where the appeal of an adverse decision to
the Supreme Court was likely.
51
C. The Modification of Nonacquiescence
On June 3, 1985, the Secretary responded to the growing controversy by
announcing a modification of the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence.52 The
new policy requires the Secretary to consider circuit precedent before reaching
a final decision in a particular case. The SSA can deny application of adverse
circuit precedent within the agency only if the agency deems those claims
to be "appropriate vehicle[s] for relitigating the issue."' 53 Individuals with
such claims will then have to appeal their "test cases" to the federal courts.
The new procedures do not provide for the application of pertinent circuit
precedent at all administrative levels. To the contrary, the state agency applies
eligibility requirements that are based on the Secretary's interpretations of
the Social Security Act and judicial interpretations in which the Secretary
acquiesces.5 4 Adverse circuit court precedent is not considered until the
claimant appeals his case to an ALJ. 5
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id. at 25.
49. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADnmrr. NEws 3080, 3095.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 37-38.
52. See Nat'l L.J., June 17, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
53. Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1405.
54. The state agency level consists of two levels of review: initial determination and recon-
sideration. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
55. Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1403.
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What happens next depends on the results of the ALJ's analysis. If an
ALJ determines that the individual seeking benefits is eligible under agency
standards, a favorable decision will be issued without consideration of circuit
precedent. 56 But if the ALJ finds that the claimant is ineligible under either
standard, the ALJ will issue an unfavorable decision describing the analysis
under both agency policy and case law. 57 Finally, in those circumstances
where the ALJ determines eligibility under circuit precedent but not under
SSA policy, a "recommended favorable decision" will be issued.',
The SSA's Appeals Council will automatically review a recommended
favorable decision. If the Appeals Council approves the ALJ's finding of
eligibility under circuit precedent, the Council will usually adopt the AL's
recommended decision. 59 In certain cases, however, the Council may find
that the facts presented provide the appropriate context in which to relitigate
adverse circuit case law. When such a case arises, the SSA Special Policy
Review Committee reviews the case in conjunction with the Office of the
General Counsel and the Department of Justice. An unfavorable decision
will be issued if all agree that relitigation is appropriate. The Appeals Council
will adopt the recommended favorable decision if the Special Committee
determines that relitigation is not appropriate. 60
Consider the impact of the new procedures in Grace's case: 6 Grace applies
for disability benefits at the appropriate state agency but is turned down
because of the existence of evidence, though it is not substantial, contra-
dicting her physician's diagnosis of disability. Grace asks the state agency
to reconsider her claim de novo but the result is the same. Grace will not
be granted disability benefits at these first two levels of administrative review
because the state agency is not allowed to consider the Second Circuit's
"treating physician rule," a precedent with which the Secretary does not
agree.
Appeal to an ALJ permits Grace to take advantage of the Second Circuit's
"treating physician rule." The ALJ issues a "recommended favorable de-
cision" because Grace is eligible for benefits under circuit precedent but not
under SSA policy. The Appeals Council automatically reviews the ALJ's
decision. After consultation with the Special Policy Review Committee, the
Office of the General Counsel, and the Department of Justice, the Appeals
Council adopts the "recommended favorable decision" because Grace's case
is not the appropriate context in which to relitigate the validity of the
"treating physician rule." Though under the new procedures Grace receives
56. Id. at 1404.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1405.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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the benefits to which she is entitled without having to appeal her claim to
federal court, this result should have been reached at the state agency level.
Furthermore, if Grace's claim had been the "test case" the agency was
looking for, she would have been in no better position than she was under
the original policy: she would be appealing her case to federal court.
II. THE AGENCY'S POSITION
Although the SSA modified its policy of nonacquiescence on June 3, 1985,
the agency did so as a compromise; it did not concede that the former policy
was illegal.62 The agency continues to maintain that because the Secretary
is not a member of the judiciary, but rather part of a co-equal branch of
government, the role played by the Secretary in court is that of a litigant,
not that of a subordinate. Therefore, the SSA believes that it, unlike lower
federal courts, is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.63
The SSA maintains that, as a litigant, stare decisis merely provides it with
a prediction of the likely outcome of federal court litigation. 64 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
litigants are permitted to make good faith arguments for courts to extend,
modify, or change the existing law.65 The agency asserts that nonacquiescence
is merely its way of exercising its right to make such arguments.
66
The SSA is also an agency charged with implementing the Social Security
Act on a nation-wide basis. Agency spokespersons assert that the SSA has
a special duty to litigate adverse circuit precedent in order to maintain
nationally uniform standards.6 7 The SSA contends that its modified policy
of nonacquiescence "will reconcile to the extent possible our efforts to have
a uniform disability program, uniform standards, and also abide by judicial
decisions.' '68
In this context, the new procedures foster an "ongoing litigation man-
agement program. ' 69 According to the SSA, the cases in which adverse
precedent is established often do not have fact patterns which present the
62. Defendants' Objections to Magistrate's Report and Recommendations at 85, n.77,
Steiberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter Defendants' Objections
to Report].
63. Id. at 75.
64. Id. at 76.
65. See FED. R. Cri. P. 11; MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL REsPONSIBur DR 7-102(A)(2)
(1980).
66. See Defendants' Objections to Report, supra note 62, at 76.
67. See supra note 23.
68. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 20, at 26.
69. Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1403.
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Secretary with a good chance of succeeding on appeal. 70 The Secretary,
however, must be able to relitigate such adverse decisions in cases where
SSA success is likely so that nationally uniform standards will be maintained.
Thus, the agency must be permitted to practice nonacquiescence in some
form.71 The Secretary points to United States v. Mendoza 72 as support for
this proposition.
In Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of non-mutual
collateral estoppel did not apply to the government. 73 The Supreme Court's
holding reflected three concerns. First, the Court wanted the government to
be able to litigate issues in multiple forums so that legal doctrine would be
thoroughly developed. 74 Second, the Court wanted the Solicitor General to
consider various "prudential factors" in deciding whether to appeal an
adverse decision. 7" Third, the Court recognized the need for new adminis-
trations to affect government litigation.76 The SSA claims that these three
concerns are met under the modified procedures.
In particular, the agency argues that Mendoza's solicitude for prosecutorial
discretion in agency litigation supports its failure to apply adverse circuit
court precedent at the state agency level. 77 The SSA is not willing to trust
state agency officials or even ALJs with the decision of whether a certain
70. Defendants' Objections to Report, supra note 62, at 79 n.72. The SSA argues:
IT]he Solicitor General frequently decides against appeal or certiorari even though
the legal conclusions of the court of appeals are believed to be erroneous. Such
decisions rest on a host of factors including: a substantial measure of prosecutorial
discretion, equitable and policy considerations, the perceived practical importance
of the decision, recognition of the limited resources of the government, and a
sensitivity to the crowded docket of the Court .... Moreover, as with other
litigants, practical considerations may effectively preclude review, for example if
there is an adequate alternative ground for the decision, if the court's result was
correct even if its rationale was not, or if there is not yet a conflict in the circuits.
Id.
71. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 20, at 26.
72. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
73. Id. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that a court's decision on an issue of
law or fact that is necessary to its judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). When a plaintiff seeks to bar the defendant from relitigating an
issue that it has lost in prior litigation, the plaintiff is using collateral estoppel offensively.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160 n.4. Formerly, courts required that both the plaintiff and the
defendant must have been parties to the prior litigation-the mutuality requirement. Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Recently, the
Supreme Court has allowed nonmutual collateral estoppel to be used against a private party.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
74. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
75. Id. at 162. ("[Tlhe Solicitor General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited
resources of the Government and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an
appeal.").
76. Id.
77. See Defendants' Objections to Report, supra note 62, at 85.
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claim is a good test case.78 Rather, the Appeals Council and its advisors
must be allowed to make this decision after full ,development of the record. 79
III. THE VALIDITY OF NONACQUIESCENCE
A. Separation of Powers
A major criticism of the SSA's original policy of nonacquiescence is that
it violated the separation of powers doctrine. Courts would often cite Mar-
bury v. Madison0 for the proposition that it is the role of the judiciary to
interpret the law.8 Consequently, courts viewed the SSA's refusal to consider
adverse circuit precedent binding within its administrative structure as a
challenge to the authority of the federal judiciary to perform its constitutional
function.
2
The separation of powers doctrine, however, does not mean that each
branch of government always performs its own constitutional function ex-
clusively. Granted, the Constitution authorizes Congress to make law, the
courts to interpret law, and the executive to enforce law, but this division
of power is not absolute. Indeed, the Constitution itself authorizes certain
shared duties. For example: the president can veto legislation,83 the senate
can confirm or reject presidential nominations of ambassadors and judges,
4
and the courts can invalidate congressional and executive acts which are
inconsistent with the constitution.
85
A better way to view the separation of powers doctrine is to understand
that it has developed as a way to describe our constitutional government of
limited powers.8 6 In this context, the power of judicial review, as articulated
by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, is a check that courts can
78. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendants'
Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation at 10, Stieberger v. Heckler, 615
F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter Defendants' Reply to Memo].
79. Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1405.
80. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
81. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 463 U.S.
1326 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacation of stay denied, 464 U.S. 880 (1983) (Pregerson,J.,
concurring); Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983); Polaski v. Heckler, 585
F. Supp. 997 (D. Minn. 1984).
82. See, e.g., Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Colo. 1983).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
84. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
85. U.S. CONST. art III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."). See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78 (interpreting art. III, § 1).
86. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 573, 578-79 (1984).
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exercise on the legislative and executive branches of government to insure
that they do not act outside the limits of their authority.87
The application of the separation of powers doctrine in our modern
administrative state, however, is complicated by several factors. Adminis-
trative agencies, unlike Congress and the executive, are not constitutionally
authorized bodies. Furthermore, Congress has delegated to some adminis-
trative agencies the three integral governmental functions: the power to make,
interpret, and enforce laws.8" Finally, traditional principles of administrative
law give agencies wide discretion to perform their governmental functions
as exemplified by the deferential standards of review courts use when re-
viewing agency action. 89
An examination of the traditional justification f6r the existence and strength
of administrative agencies reveals how the separation of powers doctrine
applies in the modern administrative state and to the SSA's policy of non-
acquiescence. This justification czn be divided into two interrelated com-
ponents: (1) the perceived value of administrative agencies in society, and
(2) the existence of control 6ver agency action.
Since their proliferation in the New Deal era, administrative agencies have
been characterized as bodies of "expert administrators" ascertaining and
promoting an "objective public interest."' 9 This characterization is based
87. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78.
88. See Strauss, supra note 86, at 578-79.
89. See Federal Administrative Procedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Section 706
provides deferential standards under which courts review agency action when a particular
agency's organic statute does not otherwise provide:
§ 706. Scope of review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided
by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court.
Id. The Social Security Act provides that "[the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982) (emphasis
added). See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VEaiucu, AmiNIsTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS
7.1 (1985).




on the following assumptions: agencies allow for the application of expertise,
they are politically isolated, they recognize the contributions of science,
technology, social science and philosophy to solving modern problems, they
are practical (as opposed to idealistic), and they can initiate change. 9' Agen-
cies have been allowed to exist, proliferate and exercise a great deal of power
on the basis of this characterization. 92
In addition, the existence of administrative agencies is defensible because
a constitutionally empowered body ultimately controls agency action. Con-
gress can control agency action by limiting the discretion it gives the agency
in its organic statute and by passing additional legislation directing the agency
to implement or change policies or procedures. 93 To a certain exterit, the
President can control agency action through his appointment and removal
power.Y
The availability of judicial review, however, has been the most frequently
used justification for the constitutionality of administrative agencies. Courts
91. See J. LANDIS, Tan ADm1NqisTRATivE PROCESS 15-46 (1938).
92. Dean Landis wrote:
It is in the light of these broad considerations that the place of the administraiive
tribunal must be found: The administrative process is, in essence, our generation's
answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes. It represents
our effort to find an answer to those inadequacies by some other method than
merely increasing executive power. If the doctrine of separation of power implies
division, it also implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of
administrative power may be the means for the preservation of that balance, so
that paradoxically enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of the doctrine
of separation of power, it may in matter of fact be the means for the preservation
of the content of that doctrine.
Id. at 46.
93. Indeed, administrative law, under the nondelegation doctrine, forbids congressional
delegation of its legislative power. See K. DAvis, 1 ADM NSTRATrvE LAW TR.naTSE § 3.2 (1978).
Congress must provide an "intelligible principle" to which the agency must conform, or the
delegation of legislative power is invalid. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1927). The Supreme Court, however, has used this doctrine only twice to invalidate
congressional delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies. See Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935). In all other cases, federal courts have upheld the validity of congressional grants
of power even when an "intelligible principle" appeared absent from the agency's statutory
grant of authority. See Amalgamated Meat Workers v. Conally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971).
Another mechanism used to control agency action is the legislative veto. The legislative veto
is a provision inserted in legislation which says that a particular agency action takes effect only
if Congress does not take steps to nullify the action within a given period of time. The Supreme
Court, however, has found the legislative veto unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.
INS v. Chadhas, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For a discussion of more informal methods of Congres-
sional control over agency action, see S. BRaYER & R. STEWART, supra note 90, at 107-09.
94. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Supreme Court suggested that it
was unconstitutional for Congress to restrict the President's power to remove governmental
officials. In Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), however, the Court limited
the application of Myers to the President's power to remove governmental officials who exercise
purely executive duties.
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examine agency action to ensure that it comports with the Constitution and
the agency's organic statute. Even though administrative law requires that
courts accord agency action a great deal of deference, "judicial review sets
an outer limit beyond which agency discretion may not be exercised." 95 In
other words, judicial review is a "check" to ensure that an agency has not
acted outside the limits of its authority.
The separation of powers doctrine is violated when an administrative
agency, no less than Congress or the President, refuses to act within the
limits of its authority. When a federal circuit court determines that the SSA
incorrectly interpreted the Social Security Act, that court has found that the
agency has acted outside of its authority. Under the original policy of
nonacquiescence, the agency would comply with this adverse decision with
respect to the parties before the court but would not apply this unappealed
ruling to subsequent claimants. 96 In effect, the SSA violated the separation
of powers doctrine by circumventing the policing action of judicial review.
Under the SSA's new policy of nonacquiescence, most claimants who want
to take advantage of circuit precedent that is inconsistent with the agency's
interpretation of the Act will not have to appeal their cases to federal court.
The SSA now considers the "law of the circuit " before the Secretary renders
a final decision.9 7 Even though this consideration does not take place until
the ALJ hearing level, the modified policy appears to present a less blatant
challenge to judicial authority because adverse circuit court precedent is no
longer ignored on a wholesale basis.
The modifications, however, are merely cosmetic changes. The SSA still
refuses to acknowledge the binding authority of circuit court precedent over
agency interpretations of the Social Security Act. 98 Permitting ALJs to con-
sider "the law of the circuit" merely foreshadows the likely outcome of a
claim that would eventually reach federal court on appeal. The new policy
may reduce the amount of time a claimant has to wait for such a result,
but it, does not eliminate the wait.
Despite the modifications, the new policy of nonacquiescence violates the
separation of powers doctrine. By applying a discredited interpretation of
the Social Security Act at the state agency level, the SSA is acting outside
the scope of its authority. 9 The fact that the SSA is likely to remedy the
use of an incorrect standard at a higher appellate level does not excuse the
initial abuse of power.
95. R. PIERCE, S. SIImo & P. VERKuII., supra note 89, at ix.
96. See supra note 12.
97. See Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1403.
98. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
99. Ironically, in modifying the original policy of nonacquiescence, the SSA has violated
the Social Security Act's mandate that uniform standards for the determination of disability
be established and applied "at all levels of determination, review, and adjudication .... ." 42
U.S.C. § 421(k)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Furthermore, the policy of nonacquiescence undermines the legitimacy of
the SSA as an administrative agency in our constitutional system. Nonac-
quiescence prevents the federal courts, constitutionally authorized bodies,
from exercising meaningful control over agency action. Granted, Congress
can still control agency action through legislation and the President can still
exercise his power to remove the Secretary. Considering the reliance that
administrative law places on judicial review as the primary method of con-
trolling agency action, however, reliance on congressional and presidential
control mechanisms may not be enough to justify the existence and strength
of administrative agencies like the SSA.
B. Stare Decisis
Another major criticism of the SSA's original policy of nonacquiescence
is that it disregards the doctrine of stare decisis.' °° Under this doctrine, a
principle of law laid down by a court is binding precedent in the same court
or in a court of lower rank in the same jurisdiction unless changes in the
social or legal climate render it necessary to reconsider the principle's con-
tinuing validity.' 0' Stare decisis is based on policy considerations such as the
need for uniformity of treatment, stability, predictability and convenience. 0 2
The SSA argues that it is not bound by stare decisis because it is not a
subordinate in the federal judicial hierarchy 03
Though technically correct, the SSA's position fails to recognize that the
same policy considerations underlying the doctrine of stare decisis in a judicial
hierarchy argue for administrative agency adherence to judicial precedent104
The SSA's original policy of nonacquiescence undermined several policy
considerations underlying stare decisis. Forcing claimants to appeal their
cases to federal court in order to take advantage of circuit precedent with
which the Secretary disagreed led to anomalous results; those who persevered
through all the administrative appeals received the benefits to which they
were entitled, while those with similar claims who did not or could not make
it to federal court received nothing. In addition, requiring claimants to
exhaust administrative remedies under the original policy of nonacquiescence
100. See, e.g., Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d
428 (8th Cir. 1983).
101. 20 AM. JuR. 2D Courts §§ 183-84 (1965).
102. Id.
103. 1B J. MooRE, J. LucAs & T. CuRumu., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.403 (2d ed.
1984).
104. Administrative agencies do tend to adhere to their own adjudicative precedent. See J.
MooRE, J. LucAs & T. CuRRIER, supra note 103, at 0.403 (authors suggest that agencies
may nevertheless need more flexibility in their litigation than regular courts because agencies
frequently make policy through adjudication). See also Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as
Applied to Administrative Decisions, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 111 (1959).
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was a waste of time and resources for both the claimants and the agency.
Moreover, stare decisis is said to carry with it a correlative duty on litigants
not to pursue claims that are unwarranted under existing law unless a good
faith argument can be made for the reversal, change, or modification of the
adverse precedent. 105 Under its original policy of nonacquiescence, the SSA's
failure to consider adverse circuit court precedent at all within the agency
made every claim a test case. The agency did not make a good faith argument
for a reversal, change, or modification of the law; instead, the agency
behaved as if the adverse case law did not exist.
The new policy of nonacquiescence differs from its predecessor in that
relitigation, though clearly a possibility, is no longer a certainty.' 6 The agency
asserts that it is making a concentrated effort to relitigate adverse circuit
court precedent in only those cases in which the agency feels it has a chance
of prevailing. 0 7 Nevertheless, as noted by the court in Stieberger v. Heckler,
there is no way to guarantee that the agency will live up to its duty and
practice restraint in its decisions to relitigate. 08
The same arguments call for agency adherence to circuit precedent at the
state agency level. The disparate treatment of claimants and the waste of
time and resources remains under the new procedures. Because the lowest
levels of agency review are least likely to set policy, agency flexibility would
not be threatened by requiring application of circuit precedent at the state
agency level.'0 9 Further, the Secretary's authority to set aside state agency
determinations through "own motion" review protects the SSA's role as a
litigator." 0
C. Due Process
Critics also opposed the original policy of nonacquiescence in the belief
that it violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment."' They charged
that the policy created two separate classes of claimants: those who had the
strength, determination and funds to make it through the administrative
review process, and those who did not."2 Nonacquiescence discriminated
105. This correlative duty is codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RSPONSmILrry DR 7-102(A)(2) (1980). See Note, supra note 11, at 596. These provisions,
however, are also relied upon by the SSA to justify their policy. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
106. See Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1403.
107. Id.
108. Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1373.
109. See supra note 104.
110. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
111. U.S. Corsr. amend. V.
112. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 29-30 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 463 U.S. 1326 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacation of stay
denied, 464 U.S. 880 (1983).
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against claimants who were so poor, mentally impaired, or physically disabled
that they could not persevere through all of the administrative levels to have
their claims vindicated in federal court.
The court's preliminary decision in Stieberger supports this view with
respect to the SSA's modified policy as well."' According to the court, the
new procedures still create two classes of claimants because the SSA does
not apply adverse circuit precedent at the state agency level." 4 The only real
change that has taken place is that for some claimants-those with fact
patterns which do not present a favorable context for relitigation-the finish
line is closer. For others, closer does not necessarily mean attainable.
Despiie the new procedures' disproportionate impact, it is difficult to
imagine a successful due process challenge to nonacquiescence in its modified
form. The Supreme Court has not applied heightened scrutiny to classifi-
cations based on wealth," 5 physical disability, or mental impairment." 6 Hence,
courts will judge the SSA's policy under the "rational basis" test. To prevail
under this test, the SSA need only show that nonacquiescence furthers a
legitimate government purpose and that the policy was rationally related to
that purpose." 7 The purpose of this policy-maintenance of nationally uni-
form standards-is a legitimate end for the agency to pursue. Further,
nonacquiescence is one way in which this end can be achieved. It is therefore
unlikely that a court would condemn the policy under the very deferential
rational basis test.
A challenge on procedural due process grounds is less problematic. When-
ever the government deprives an individual of a "property" or "liberty"
interest which is protected by the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth
amendment, procedural safeguards are required."' In Mathews v. Eldridge,9
the Supreme Court stated that while "[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner,"' 1 20 the procedures required in a particular case would
depend upon the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.121
113. Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1374.
114. Id. at 1370.
115. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
116. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
117. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
118. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPRo & P. VERKtm, supra note 89, at 6.3.
119. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
120. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
121. Id. at 335.
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The SSA's policy of nonacquiescence in its modified form must be tested
under the Mathews balancing test to determine if it violates the dictates of
procedural due process.
First, failing to apply adverse circuit precedent at all levels of the admin-
istrative review process has a profound effect upon claimants. Requiring
that claimants exhaust administrative remedies is an exercise in futility be-
cause the agency is not going to apply adverse precedent-at least until the
ALJ level is reached.'2 In the meantime, claimants are forced to endure
physical, emotional, and financial hardships, which will discourage individ-
uals with meritorious claims from appealing the agency's denial or termi-
nation of their benefits.123
Second, the risk that claimants will be erroneously deprived of benefits
under the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence is high. Failure to apply circuit
precedent at all levels of the administrative process is an "error inherent in
the truthfinding process."' 1 Requiring that the Secretary respect the "law
of the circuit" will totally remedy such erroneous deprivations.
Finally, the government's interests are not jeopardized by requiring that
the SSA apply circuit precedent at all levels of the administrative process.
The agency asserts that nonacquiescence enables it to litigate those cases in
which it has a good chance of prevailing. Thus, nonacquiescence promotes
the SSA's legitimate interest in maintaining nationally uniform standards
under the Social Security Act. 125 The Secretary, however, can promote this
interest just as effectively through the exercise of "own motion" review at
the state agency level. 26 Though the SSA would have to expend additional
time, effort and resources to thoroughly screen state agency determinations,
the SSA's extensive evaluation of AL's "recommended favorable decisions"
could be eliminated.
127
The government also has an interest "in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources."'' 2 Those claimants who reach the ALJ level and
are able to take advantage of circuit precedent, receive retroactive as well
as prospective benefits. 29 Thus, in theory, nonacquiescence does not save
agency resources; it merely delays their expenditure. In practice, however,
not all claimants appeal the denial or termination of benefits. 30 Failure to
122. See Interim Circular, supra note 17, at 1403.
123. See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
124. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345.
125. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
128. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
129. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(a) (1986) ("You are entitled to disability benefits beginning
with the first month covered by your application in which you meet all the other requirements
for entitlement."). The regulations under Title XVI do not specify when entitlement to SSI
benefits begin.
130. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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apply circuit precedent at all administrative levels should not be justified by
cost-savings attributable to this phenomenon.
The SSA's policy of nonacquiescence in its modified form thus fails to
meet the dictates of procedural due process under the Mathews balancing
test. On one side of the scale are the claimants' great interests in the receipt
of benefits to which they are entitled, the high risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of benefits under the policy and the assurance of a remedy for such
wrongful deprivations if acquiescence in circuit precedent is required. On
the other side of the scale are the government's interests in nationally uniform
standards under the Social Security Act and in preserving public funds.
Although these governmental interests are legitimate, they can easily be
promoted in other ways. Under its policy of nonacquiescence, the SSA does
not provide a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."
D. The Significance of Mendoza
The Secretary relies on the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States
v. Mendoza to support the policy of intra-circuit nonacquiescence.'3 ' In
Mendoza, the plaintiff, a Filipino national seeking naturalization in the
United States, argued that the government's administration of the Nationality
Act of 1940 during World War II denied him due process of law. Without
reaching the merits of the plaintiff's case, the district court granted the
petition on the grounds that the government was precluded from relitigating
the due process issue because the government had litigated and lost on the
same issue in a prior case which it had not appealed. 3 2 The court of appeals
affirmed.'
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel does not apply to the government. 3 4 The Court recognized that the
government's role as a litigant is unique because of the geographic breadth
and volume of government litigation. 35 Further, the government litigates
issues that have a substantial impact on the public. 3 6 As a result, the
government, more so than any other litigant, finds itself in court litigating
the same issues against different parties. 3 7 The Court concluded that per-
mitting nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel to be used against such a
litigious entity as the government is unwise for three reasons.
131. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
132. The prior case was In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
133. Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982).
134. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163 (1984).
135. Id. at 160-61.




First, the Court recognized the desirability of the -well-developed legal
doctrine that results from litigation in multiple forums. 38 It feared that
application of this doctrine would "thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue."'3 9 The Court also feared having to change its policy of waiting
until there was a split in the circuits before granting the government's
petitions for certiorari."4'
Mandatory intra-circuit acquiescence does not threaten the Court's interest
in allowing litigation of issues in multiple forums. Permitting nonmutual
collateral estoppel to be used offensively against the government would bind
the government in every circuit.' 4' Under mandatory intra-circuit acquies-
cence, on the other hand, the SSA would be precluded from relitigating an
adverse court of appeals interpretation only within the circuit in which the
decision was rendered. The agency would still be free to litigate the issue in
another circuit.
The Court's second reason for holding that the doctrine of nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel did not apply to the government was because
it wanted to permit the Solicitor General to continue exercising prosecutorial
discretion. 42 When the Solicitor General considers whether to appeal an
adverse decision, he has to consider factors other than the potential success
or failure of the government's case. He also has to take into account
"prudential concerns" such as the government's limited resources and the
Court's crowded dockets.
43
Requiring that the SSA abandon its policy of intra-circuit nonacquiescence
does not threaten the Solicitor General's prosecutorial discretion. If he de-
cides not to appeal an adverse decision, he is free to litigate the legal issue
in another circuit. Indeed, the "prudential concerns" discussed by the Su-
preme Court in Mendoza were not promoted by the SSA's original policy
of nonacquiescence because claimants had to appeal to the federal courts in
order to have circuit precedent with which the Secretary disagreed applied
to their case. The new procedures should eliminate a great deal of the federal
court litigation that resulted from the SSA's original policy.
The Court's final reason for its holding in Mendoza was its recognition
that the manner in which an administration conducts its litigation reflects
public policy choices that should not bind successive administrations.' For




141. Id. at 160.
142. Id. at 161-62.
143. Id. at 162.
144. Id. at 162-63.
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the government's administration of the Nationality Act of 1940 violated due
process was based on the Carter Administration's interest in following "a
course of compassion and amnesty."' 45 The Court reasoned that application
of the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel would bind the
current administration, which in reality was not party to the prior litigation,
to the prior administration's policy choices. 46
Mandatory intra-circuit acquiescence does not bind successive administra-
tions to the policy choices made by their predecessors. The SSA can litigate
unappealed adverse circuit precedent in another circuit if a new administra-
tion wishes to pursue different policies. In the event that every circuit has
decided the issue in question against the agency and that none of these
decisions have been appealed, the Secretary can ask Congress to legislate
the particular issue into the Social Security Act.
Thus, the factors that led the Court in Mendoza to decide that nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel does not apply to the government would not be
threatened by requiring the SSA to acquiesce in adverse circuit court decisions
which the agency does not intend to appeal. Mendoza is not good precedent
for the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence because mandatory intra-circuit
acquiescence is significantly different from nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel against the government. Under the former, the SSA would be
precluded from relitigating an adverse circuit court decision only within the
circuit in which the decision was made, while the latter would bind the
agency in every circuit.
E. Public Policy Concerns
Critics of nonacquiescence, in both its original and modified forms, argue
that the practical effects this policy has on claimants is a sufficient reason
to require the Secretary to apply adverse circuit precedent at all levels of
the administrative process. For a variety of reasons, such as lack of funds,
ill-health, trust in the system, or even ignorance, fewer and fewer people
appeal unfavorable decisions at each higher level of the administrative review
process. 47 From a practical standpoint, nonacquiescence exploits this be-
havior.
Even for those claimants who make it to the ALJ hearing level, the strain
of pursuing futile procedures has a negative effect on their mental and
physical condition. 48 While the SSA does permit a claimant whose benefits
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Approximately two-thirds of those individuals who were denied disability benefits at
the initial state agency level failed to reach the ALJ hearing level. See Stieberger, 615 F. Supp.
at 1371.
148. Id. at 1342.
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have been terminated to continue receiving payments while seeking appellate
review, 149 there is no such provision for first-time claimants. Even a first-
time claimant receiving a recommended favorable decision from an ALJ
may still have to wait for the Appeals Council to review the decision before
receiving benefits.
150
The policy of nonacquiescence also undermines the public's confidence in
the SSA.151 The agency should be a place where eligible individuals can go
to receive their benefits in accordance with the Social Security Act. When
the SSA refuses to apply circuit precedent which would allow claimants to
receive the benefits to which they are entitled at the state agency level, it
frustrates claimants who end up losing faith in the agency's willingness to
help them. The agency loses its aura of being a body of "expert adminis-
trators" ascertaining and promoting an "objective public interest."'
5 2
Furthermore, critics correctly view the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence
as lawlessness. 53 The existence and power of administrative agencies is de-
fensible because a constitutionally authorized body exercises ultimate control
over agency action. Judicial review of the SSA's policies and procedures is
the primary control mechanism used to ensure that the agency does not act
outside of its authority. 5 4 The agency's legitimacy is threatened when it
circumvents this control through its policy of nonacquiescence. It is ques-
tionable whether society as a whole can afford to permit the SSA, an agency
whose actions affect so many citizens, to continue acting outside the scope
of its authority in this manner.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The best solution to the problems created by nonacquiescence would be
for the SSA voluntarily to abandon this policy and apply circuit court
precedent at all administrative levels. Ideally, the Secretary would acknow-
ledge that nonacquiescence was not legitimate, constitutionally or practically.
Then the agency could promise to relitigate only adverse circuit court prec-
edent in other circuits. The SSA's modified policy is a step in the right
direction, but it does not go far enough. As Attorney General Meese's recent
statements on the precedential. effect of Supreme Court caselaw indicate, the
friction between the executive and judicial branches of government has not
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(g) (Supp. III 1985).
150. See Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1373; see also Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 20,
at 173 (statement of Eileen P. Sweeney, National Senior Citizens Law Center).
151. See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 20, at 160 (statement of Arthur S. Flemming,
Co-Chairman of Save Our Security Coalition).
152. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
153. See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 20, at 59-60 (statement of Hon. Barney Frank,
Rep. from Mass.).
154. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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lessened. 5 It is therefore unlikely that the SSA will voluntarily abandon all
remnants of this policy. Further, the damage caused by this policy is sig-
nificant enough to counsel a more interventionist solution.
A. Judicial Solutions
Until now, the federal courts have been left to deal with the SSA's policy
of nonacquiescence. The courts have often responded by certifying large
class actions against the Secretary.' 5 6 Because the agency will follow an
adverse circuit court decision in regards to parties before the court,1 57 such
class actions have the virtue of spreading a favorable decision over more
claimants. Courts have also been willing to waive the requirement that
claimants exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking review in
federal court.' s5 Thus, the class action is able to represent even more claim-
ants.
The courts, however, do not have the option of waiving the requirement
that claimants present their claims to the Secretary prior to seeking review
in federal court. 59 This nonwaivable presentment requirement precludes the
courts from institutionalizing a judicial interpretation of the Social Security
Act to benefit all future claimants within a particular circuit. Thus, even
large class actions are piecemeal attempts to deal with the SSA's nonac-
quiescence in particular circuit court interpretations of the law.
In addition, courts have been reluctant to fashion remedies which have
"the potential for bringing the Judicial Branch into protracted involvement
with the Executive Branch in the administration of a complex regulatory
scheme affecting hundreds of thousands of persons."' For example, in
155. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), injunction vacated
sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
157. See Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 428
(8th Cir. 1983).
158. Under § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, an individual can seek review of a final
decision of the Secretary in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). The "final decision"
requirement has two parts: (1) a nonwaivable requirement that the claim for disability benefits
has been presented to the Secretary, and (2) a waivable requirement that the claimant has
exhausted his administrative remedies. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976).
A court will waive the exhaustion requirement in the "appropriate" circumstances: "where
plaintiffs' legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits, where exhaustion would be
futile, or where the harm suffered pending exhaustion would be irreparable." Stieberger, 615
F. Supp. at 1329. See also Bowen v. City of New York, 106 S. Ct. 2022, 2031-32 (1986). Cf.
Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1326, 1335 (9th Cir.) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (citations omitted),
vacation of stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983) ("Although there are other federal-court opinions
which have accepted that argument, there is no decision of this Court that has interpreted the
Secretary's announcement of her interpretation of a Social Security statute as a waiver of the
exhaustion requirement.")
159. See supra note 158.
160. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Stieberger, the district court's preliminary injunction contained the following
provisions: (1) it enjoined the Secretary and all his personnel and agents
from denying or terminating benefits under policies that are inconsistent
with Second Circuit precedent; (2) it ordered the Secretary to rescind all
policies concerning nonacquiescence, in a particular decision or in general,
with respect to New York residents; and (3) it required that the Secretary
distribute a copy of all adverse Second Circuit decisions to all his personnel
and agents who adjudicate disability claims with instructions that the decision
is to be followed.
16'
The Secretary appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which subsequently vacated the
injunction in Stieberger v. Bowen. 62 The court's major concern was that
the district court's preliminary injunction subjected agency adjudicators to
potential contempt proceedings for violating the injunction when the denial
or termination of disability benefits was caused by misapplying, not disre-
garding, the circuit precedent. 63
In addition, the court concluded that the preliminary injunction granted
in Stieberger was no longer necessary in light of the permanent injunction
granted by the Second Circuit in Schisler v. Heckler.'6 That injunction
directed the Secretary to order the SSA to announce in "appropriate pub-
lications" that the "treating physician rule" was to be applied at all ad-
ministrative levels.I6s The court reasoned that proceeding with the Schisler
injunction "will minimize intrusion into the administrative process and at
the same time accord the Secretary the opportunity to demonstrate his good-
faith compliance with the law of this Circuit and his readiness to take
appropriate action to see that law implemented throughout the administrative
process that he supervises.' 1 66 Unfortunately, relying on the Secretary's
"good-faith" may be an exercise in futility.
B. Congressional Solutions
Another way to deal with the SSA's refusal to apply adverse circuit
precedent is congressional amendment of the Social Security Act to disallow
this practice. This is an appropriate remedy because it is the lack of clarity
in the Act which leads to differing interpretations in the first place. If
Congress is not going to pass statutes that are subject to precise interpre-
tation, it can at least specify which, agency or court, will have the final
161. Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at app. A.
162. 801 F.2d 29.
163. Id. at 35.
164. 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986).
165. Id. at 84.
166. Stieberger, 801 F.2d at 38.
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word. Regardless of the propriety or desirability of such congressional action,
the political reality is that Congress is not likely to amend the Act to proscribe
SSA nonacquiescence in circuit precedent. This is illustrated by Congress'
failure to pass the Senate and House bills in 1984.167
Maybe the best solution to the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence is to
require Congress to take responsibility for determining SSA policies by giving
the agency specific legislative directives. This solution would shift primary
control of the agency's action from the courts to Congress. Of course, courts
would still exercise judicial review, but the clearer statutory language would
reduce the likelihood that the Secretary and a court would disagree. This
solution also takes into account that the SSA is not a body of "expert
administrators" which ascertains and implements an "objective public in-
terest."' 68 Because Congress is a constitutionally authorized body, as well
as democratically elected, the agency's legitimacy would remain intact. Though
resistant to politically unpopular acts, Congress has demonstrated its ability
to assume responsibility for controlling agency action in its passage of the
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984.169
CONCLUSION
The SSA's modification of its policy of intra-circuit nonacquiescence has
not answered the concerns which motivated criticism of the original policy.
The new procedures violate the separation of powers doctrine, the stare
decisis doctrine and due process. They also produce undesirable practical
consequences which the government and public can ill-afford to tolerate. A
solution which requires the SSA to adhere to adverse circuit precedent must
be found. Preferably, the SSA should renounce nonacquiescence voluntarily.
Realistically, Congress should either amend the Social Security Act to require
SSA compliance with adverse circuit court precedent or give the agency
specific legislative directives to follow.
ANGELA M. JOHNSON
167. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
169. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat.
1794 (1984).
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